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Abstract
Largely through the efforts of Scott DeLancey the grammatical category “mi-
rative” has gained currency in linguistics. DeLancey bases his elaboration of
this category on a misunderstanding of the semantics of h
.
dug in “Lhasa” Ti-
betan. Rather than showing “surprising information”, linguists working on
Tibetan have long described h
.
dug as a sensory evidential. Much of the evi-
dence DeLancey and Aikhenvald present for mirativity in other languages is
also susceptible to explanation in terms of sensory evidence or appears close
to Lazard’s “mediative” (1999) or Johanson’s “indirective” (2000). Until an
independent grammatical category for “new information” is described in a
way which precludes analysis in terms of sensory evidence or other well estab-
lished evidential categories, mirativity should be excluded from the descriptive
arsenal of linguistic analysis.
Keywords: evidential, inflection, information structure, mirative, syntax, Ti-
betan
nisi videro . . . non credam
– Doubting Thomas
1. Introduction
1.1. Advent of mirativity
Although Scott DeLancey did not coin the term “mirative”1 he “was the first
scholar to demonstrate that [. . .] there is enough data to postulate it as a distinct
1. As antecedents DeLancey acknowledges Jacobsen (1964: 630 et passim) and the “admirative”
category of Balkan linguistics. However, Jacobsen uses “mirative” to describe a morphosyn-
tactic category specific to Washo and does not promote “mirativity” as a crosslinguistic cate-
gory.
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semantic and grammatical category” (Aikhenvald 2004: 195). The cornerstone
of DeLancey’s analysis of mirativity is his description of h
.
dug in “Lhasa” Ti-
betan. Although most researchers describe the Tibetan morpheme h
.
dug as a
sensory evidential (Bell 1905: 40, Yukawa 1966, Goldstein & Nornang 1970:
23, Chang & Chang 1984: 605, Tournadre 1996: 224–226, Volkart 2000, Gar-
rett 2001: 52–93), DeLancey argues that h
.
dug marks an utterance as containing
information which is surprising to the speaker, a category which he dubs “mi-
rative” (e.g., 1986, 1997: 44–45, 2001). Because most researchers working on
Tibetan have failed to engage DeLancey’s account of h
.
dug, there may seem no
need to argue against his interpretation.2 However, DeLancey’s elaboration of
the “mirative” is influential beyond Tibetan and Tibeto-Burman, having gained
a currency in linguistics at large.3
A few searches in Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com) can be taken
to approximately measure the extent of DeLancey’s influence compared to
other researchers who have written about h
.
dug. DeLancey’s two articles de-
voted to promoting “mirativity” crosslinguistically (DeLancey 1997, 2001) are
cited 119 times and 56 times respectively (site accessed 17 May 2010, 15:03).
Volkart’s description of h
.
dug (2000) garners a mere two hits (site accessed
17 May 2010, 15:17) and Google’s database appears not to include Yukawa’s
(1966) study (site accessed 17 May 2010. 15:18). Given the extent to which
the typological literature on “mirativity” depends on DeLancey’s description of
the Tibetan morpheme h
.
dug this literature deserves to be re-examined. Other
evidence for mirativity which DeLancey points to in Hare, Sunwar, Korean,
Turkish, and other languages is equally well accounted for with grammatical
categories other than mirativity, including sensory evidence. The further ex-
amples of mirativity which Aikhenvald points to are also generally best anal-
ysed otherwise. Since most instances of mirativity reported in the literature are
best analysed other ways, mirativity should be withdrawn from the theoretical
repertoire of descriptive linguistics.
1.2. Previous sceptics
DeLancey’s elaboration of mirativity has not gone unchallenged. In particu-
lar, Lazard (1999) suggests that ‘inference’, ‘hearsay’, and ‘unexpected obser-
vation/immediate perception’ are but three semantic uses of a broader “me-
diative” grammatical category and that “mirativity as such is only rarely and
2. DeLancey’s work makes no appearance in the bibliography of Volkart (2000); the writings
of Denwood (1999), Garrett (2001), Chonjore (2003), and Tournadre (2008) appear to have
been uninfluenced by DeLancey’s thoughts on this topic.
3. In addition to work on Tibetan (e.g., Zeisler 2000) “mirativity” has been employed in the de-
scriptions of Magar (Grunow-Hårsta 2007), Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000), Hindi/Urdu (Montaut
2006), and many other languages.
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dubiously grammaticalized” (Lazard 1999: 91). In general I find Lazard’s ar-
gument persuasive. However, he accepts DeLancey’s analysis of the Tibetan
data (Lazard 1999: 104), which I do not. Furthermore, in describing the third
semantic use of the “mediative” Lazard sometimes uses terms such as “unex-
pected observation” and sometimes “immediate perception”. The latter, sen-
sory evidence, certainly is a grammatical category; it is the category which
Tibetan h
.
dug encodes. In contrast, “new information”, although it may occur,
as one non-grammaticalized use of a broader “mediative” category as Lazard
suggests, is not a valid grammatical category.4
Curnow (2001) also expresses scepticism at elements of DeLancey’s ac-
count. Specifically, he argues against the explanation of conjunct/disjunct sys-
tems as grammaticalized mirativity. Posing the question of whether or not con-
junct/disjunct systems can derive from mirativity implicitly accepts that “con-
junct/disjunct” and “mirativity” are correct characterizations of certain linguis-
tic phenomena. Tournadre (2008) has already convincingly argued that “con-
junct/disjunct” is an ill-advised conceptual apparatus for descriptive linguistics
and I avoid here discussion of Tibetan or other languages in such terms. The
goal of this essay is to show that looking for mirativity in the world’s languages
is equally ill-advised. In this respect, my disagreement with DeLancey is more
substantial than Curnow’s.
2. Tibetan h
.
dug and mirativity
2.1. Overview of the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system
2.1.1. Verbal categories and constructions. Ideally one should draw a dis-
tinction among the language of the city of Lhasa itself, other dialects of Central
Tibet, and the lingua franca of the Tibetan diaspora (Miller 1955, Róna-Tas
1985: 160–161). However, because previous authors, including DeLancey, do
not clearly maintain these distinctions, it is not possible to do so here. In or-
der to keep the ambiguity of the underlying language in focus I write “Lhasa”
with double quotes. The defence of h
.
dug as a sensory evidential presented here
makes use of no original fieldwork. The existing literature on “Lhasa” Tibetan
is ample enough for the goal at hand.5
The verbal system of “Lhasa” Tibetan exhibits a three-way paradigmatic
contrast within the forms of the verb ‘to be’ and across all of affixes encod-
ing tense categories. I refer to these three categories as “personal”, “factual”,
4. The “mediative” is not a category which is relevant to the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system,
although it may be for other languages.
5. A study of available examples using corpus tools may shed great light on the evidential system
of “Lhasa” Tibetan in a way impossible through elicitation.
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Table 1. The verb ‘to be’
Existential Copula
Personal yod yin
Factual yod-pa-red red (yod-pa-red)
Testimonial h
.
dug red-bz´ag (h
.
dug)
Table 2. Verbal auxiliaries
Future Present Past Perfect
Personal V-gi-yin V-gi-yod V-pa-yin / byun˙a V-yod
Factual V-gi-red V-gi-yod-pa-red V-pa-red V-yod-pa-red
Testimonial — V-gi-h
.
dug V-son˙ V-bz´ag
a. The form V-pa-yin is used in volitional sentences whereas the form V-byun˙ is used in non-
volitional sentences (cf. Tournadre 1996: 231–235).
and “testimonial” (Table 1).6 The forms in parentheses do occur as copulas,
but they are rare and their usage is not well understood (Garrett 2001: 70, 91;
Chonjore 2003: 207). However, it is clear that h
.
dug as a copula is restricted to
use with adjectival predicates (Garrett 2001: 68). The morpheme h
.
dug paradig-
matically contrasts with yod and yod-pa-red in three constructions: the copula
and existential verb ‘to be’, and the present auxiliary. In addition, because the
morpheme bz´ag is negated as mi-h
.
dug, the perfect can be added as a fourth
context in which h
.
dug contrasts with yod and yod-pa-red. Before attempting to
specify the semantics of h
.
dug and the testimonial, of which it is an exponent,
it is useful to provide examples of these four grammatical contexts.
2.1.2. Verbs of existence. In the first construction these morphemes serve as
full verbs indicating existence: yod (1), yod-pa-red (2), and h
.
dug (3).
(1) a. khyod-kyi
/khyöP-kyi
you-gen
ra
ra
goat
n˙ah
.
i
ngaI
me-gen
rtsar
ts@r
place-obl
yod.7
yöP/
exist-per
‘I have got your goat.’ (Lewin 1879: 10)
6. In non-finite clauses the difference among these three is often neutralized in favour of the
personal (cf. Chang & Chang 1984: 607–608; DeLancey 1990: 298).
7. I have unified the transliteration of Tibetan examples throughout, provided a transliteration
when none was provided in the original and tacitly corrected spelling mistakes. When a source
provides a phonetic transcription, I have given this also. I have adjusted these transcriptions to
make them more consistent. This I have done by implementing the conventions of Tournadre
for velars, retroflex consonants, vowels, and nasalization, but using -P for the glottal stop
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b. n˙a-tshor
/`ngantsOO
me-plr-obl
phyu-pa
´chup@
clothes8
gsar-pa
´saapa
new
yod
yöP/
exist-per
‘We have new clothes.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 31)
(2) bod-la
/`phöP-l@
Tibet-obl
h
.
brog-pa
`trokpa
nomad
man˙-po
`m@nku
many
yod-pa-red
`yOPreP/
exist-fac
‘There are many nomads in Tibet.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 20)
(3) a. thab
/th@b
hearth
h
.
dih
.
i
dii
this-gen
sten˙-la
teng la
above-obl
ña
nya
fish
skam-pah
.
i
k@m-pö9
dry-gen
phyir-du
chir-tu
in.order.to
grab
t@b10
method
mi-h
.
dug
mi duP/11
not-exist-tes
‘There are no shelves over the fire for the drying of fish.’ (Lewin
1879: 71)
b. sman-khan˙
/´mänkan
hospital
pha-gir
´ph@ke˙e˙
over-there
h
.
dug
tuP/
exist-tes
‘There is a hospital over there.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 10)
2.1.3. Copula verb. The copula exhibits a total of five forms: yin (4), red
(5), yod-pa-red (6), red-bz´ag (7), and h
.
dug (8).
(4) rkun-ma
thief
zin
catch
mkhan
the.one.who
n˙a
me
yin
is-per
‘I am the man who caught the thief.’ (Bell 1905: 36)
(or falling tone) and doubled letters rather than a colon (:) for long vowels. When a source
includes more vowels, consonants, or tones than Tournadre I leave them as they are, unless
it is straightforward to substitute their notation with symbols from the International Phonetic
Alphabet. I have surely introduced errors in some cases; the reader should consult the original
in cases of doubt.
In the translation of Tibetan a hyphen is used to transliterate a specific Tibetan character
called the tsheg which marks the boundary between two syllables. (This punctuation also
occurs between words, but it is only transliterated word-internally.) Normally (more than
80 % of the time) the tsheg corresponds to morpheme breaks, but some morpheme breaks
are not marked off. We follow this Tibetan studies convention here, rather than the rules for
morphemic glossing.
8. This word refers to a specific traditional Tibetan garment.
9. One expects /k@m-paI/ rather than /k@m-pö/.
10. One expects /tr@b/ rather than /t@b/.
11. One expects /minduP/ rather than /mi duP/.
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(5) h
.
di
/`ti
this
deb
`thep
book
red
`reeP/
is-fac
‘This is a book.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 3)
(6) spran˙-po
/´panko
beggar
skyid-po
´kyipu
happy
z´e-drags
`she´traa
very
yod-pa-red
`yOP`reP/
is-fac
‘Yes, the beggars are very happy.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 615)
(7) chu
/´chu
water
red-bz´ag
`reP-shaP/
is-tes
‘[Tiens], c’est de l’eau. [(Here,) it’s water.]’ (Tournadre 1996: 238)
(8) a. z´im-po
/shimpo
tasty
h
.
dug
duP/
is-tes
‘It is pleasing.’ (Lewin 1879: 18).
b. ja
/`cha
tea
h
.
di
`ti
this
z´im-po
`shimpo
delicious
h
.
dug
`tuP/
is-tes
‘Ce thé est excellent. [This tea is excellent.]’ (Tournadre 1996:
225)
2.1.4. Present auxiliaries. In the second construction these morphemes
serve as auxiliary verbs which indicate that the verbal action is ongoing at
the time of the utterance:12 yod (9), yod-pa-red (10), h
.
dug (11).
(9) a. n˙a
/nga
I
h
.
gro-gi-yod
dro-gi-yö/
go-prs-per
‘I go’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50).
b. n˙a
/`nga
I
bod-skad-kyi
´phöökääP-khi
Tibetan-language-gen
slob-deb
´lOktep
textbook
klog-gi-yod
´lo˙o˙kiyöP/
read-prs-per
‘I’m reading a Tibetan textbook.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970:
106)
c. n˙a
/`nga
I
pha-gir,
´ph@ke˙e˙,
over-there,
a,
an,
ah,
sdod-kyi-yod
`tüü´ki `yöP/
stay-prs-per
‘I’m, ah, staying over there.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 606)
12. Hoshi (1994) provides a detailed analysis of the tense and aspect uses of this construction.
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(10) a. lo
/lo
year
bz´i tsam
shi-ts@
four about
h
.
gro-gi-yod-pa-red
dro-gi-yö-wa-re/
go-prs-fac
‘it is about four years’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50)
b. za-chas
/`sapcääP
food-stuffs
btson˙-gi-yod-pa-red
´tsunki`yOPreP/
sell-prs-fac
‘They are selling foodstuffs.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 104)
(11) a. khyed-ran˙
/khye-rang
you
phebs-kyi-h
.
dug
phe-gi-du/
go-prs-tes
‘you go’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50)
b. kho
/´kho
he
sn˙a-po
´ngapo
early
lan˙-gi-h
.
dug-gas?
`l@nki `tuke˙e˙P/
get-up-prs-tes
‘Does he get up early?’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 104)
2.1.5. Perfect auxiliary. In the third construction these morphemes serve as
auxiliary verbs which indicates that the verbal action is complete at the time of
the utterance: yod (12), yod-pa-red (13), h
.
dug (14).
(12) bris-yod
/`thriPyöP/
write-prf-per
‘I have written it.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 88)
(13) spu-gu
/´puku
boy
kha-s´as
´khashäP
some
gcig
chi
one
slebs-yod-pa-red
´le˙P `yOP `reP/
arrive-prf-fac
‘Several boys have come.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 622)
(14) a. tsam-pa
/´tsanpa
Tsampa
zas-mi-h
.
dug
`säPmintuP/
eat-not-prf-tes
‘He hasn’t eaten Tsam-pa.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 84)
b. ri-bon˙
/`re´kon
Rabbit
ni
´ni
top
zin-mi-h
.
dug
`sim `min´tuP/
catch-not-prf-tes
‘As for the rabbit, you haven’t caught him.’ (Chang & Chang
1984: 621)
2.2. The traditional explanation of h
.
dug: A sensory evidential
Most researchers understand h
.
dug as marking direct perception as the source
of information for the knowledge conveyed in an utterance. Bell (1905: 40)
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was the first to draw attention to the use of h
.
dug as a visual evidential, writing
that “h
.
dug means ‘I saw it there but am not sure whether it is still there or
not’ ”.13 Yukawa (1966: 78) confirms the significance of visual evidence in
distinguishing h
.
dug and yod-pa-red as existential copulas:
duuはその事物が話し手から見えている場合に用いられ´yoo-
reeは見えないが、何からの理由でその事物があるということ
を話し手が知っている場合に用いられる。
[h
.
dug is used in the case where the speaker is able to see the object,
and yod-pa-red is used in the case where the speaker knows that the
object is there for some other reason.]
Yukawa’s explanation is based on the following two examples:14
(15) a. btson˙-khan˙
/´tsonkan
shop
h
.
dir
`dee
this
deb
ˆteb
book
yag-po
`yago
good
yod-pa-red
yoo-ree/
exist-fac
[Speaker A says to speaker B, when neither can see the book
before entering:] ‘This shop has good books.’ (Yukawa 1966: 78)
b. h
.
dir
/`dee
here
deb
ˆteb
book
yag-po
`yago
good
h
.
dug
duu/
exist-tes
[Speaker A says after they have entered the shop while looking
at the book:] ‘Here is a good book.’ (Yukawa 1966: 78)
Yukawa (1966: 78) further observes that “duuが用いられるのは見える場
合だけではなく、他の感覚で認識しうる場合もある [h
.
dug is not only
used in the case of being able to see, there are also cases where the recognition
occurs through some other sense]”, as in the following example where “子供
たちが外で遊んでいる声を聞けば、姿は見えなくても[one can hear the
voices of children playing outside even without seeing their forms]” (Yukawa
1966: 78).
(16) phyi-logs-la
/´chilooP la
outside-obl
spu-gu-tsho
´bugu-tso
child-plr
h
.
dug
duu/
exist-tes
‘外に子供たちがいる. [The children are outside.]’ (Yukawa 1966:
78)
13. Bell does not provide examples to demonstrate this claim.
14. In fact he writes “A氏がB氏を案内して«この店にはいい本がある»という場合（その
本はまだ見えていない。)” for (15a) and “その店にはいってその本を見ながら、«こ
こにいい本がある»という時” for (15b).
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Yukawa tests the hypothesis that h
.
dug is a sensory evidential also for h
.
dug and
yod-pa-red used as present auxiliaries (Yukawa 1966: 82–83) and as copula
verbs (Yukawa 1966: 79–81), finding that direct perception accounts for the
use of h
.
dug rather than yod-pa-red in all cases.
Much more briefly Goldstein & Nornang (1970: 23) also remark that as op-
posed to constructions with yod-pa-red those with h
.
dug “imply actual vi-
sual knowledge” (emphasis in original).15 Although Chang & Chang do not
invoke evidentiality as a category per se their description of h
.
dug as an existen-
tial copula describes clearly the importance of visual evidence: “[t]he speaker
commonly uses h
.
dug when referring to either that at which he is looking at the
moment or that which he has seen in the past” (Chang & Chang 1984: 605).16
(17) a. h
.
dir,
/`te˙e˙,
there
mtshan-tho
´tshänto
name-register
kha-shas
´khasheP
some
ran˙
`ran
even
h
.
dug
`tuP/
exist-tes
[A prospective guest is looking at the list of those invited to a pic-
nic:] ‘And then, there are quite a few others on the list of names,
too.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 605)
b. da
/`te˙e˙,
now
lhag-ma
lhamaP
left-overs
brgya-dan˙
`kya th@
hundred
gsum
sum
and
bz´i-tsam
`shits@
four-some
cig
chi
a
h
.
dug
`tuP/
exist-tes
[A trader knows how many bags of fabric he has because he has
counted them:] ‘Now, there are a hundred and three or a hundred
and four left over.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 605–606)
Tournadre associates each of the morphological categories presented above
with an evidential meaning, employing the terminology “egophoric” (yod),
“factual” (yod-pa-red),17 and “testimonial” (h
.
dug). The egophoric (yod) re-
flects knowledge the speaker has through personal involvement (Tournadre
1996: 220–224), the factual knowledge which is well known (Tournadre 1996:
227–231), and the testimonial knowledge gained through direct perception
(Tournadre 1996: 224–226). I substitute the term “personal” for “egophoric”
because it is elegant to have all three names end with -al, similar to how the
terms for mood used in Indo-European languages “indicative”, “optative”, and
“subjunctive” all end in -ive. Two of Tournadre’s examples exhibit the testimo-
nial meaning of h
.
dug clearly.
15. Because of their use of the word “constructions” one can assume that this description holds
true as much for the use of these morphemes as existential copula verbs as for their use as
auxiliary verbs.
16. They think that visual evidence is however not primary and that the major factor is “certainty”.
17. Tournadre used to prefer the term “assertative” (1996: 227, 2003: 412–413) but now finds
“factual” a more appealing term (Tournadre 2008: 295).
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(18) a. ja
/`cha
tea
h
.
di
`ti
this
z´im-po
`shimpo
delicious
h
.
dug
`tuP/
is-tes
‘Ce thé est excellent. [This tea is excellent.]’ (Tournadre 1996:
225)
b. ltos-dan˙
/´töP-ta
look-imp
Lha-mo
´lhamo
Lhamo
pha-gir
´phakir
over-there
ga-re
`khare
what?
byed-gi-h
.
dug
`cheP-kituP/
do-prs-tes
‘Regarde, que fait Lhamo là-bas? [Look, what is Lhamo doing
over there?]’ (Tournadre 1996: 225 citing Hu Tan et al. 1989: 74)
In a study of the morpheme h
.
dug across several Central Tibetan dialects,
Volkart (2000: 142–143) concludes that a meaning ‘I can see it’ was “the
unified original meaning of the evidential auxiliary morpheme h
.
dug”. Garrett
(2001: 2003) characterizes the testimonial (which he calls “direct”) as indi-
cating “direct perceptual evidence”. Chonjore (2003: xxv) describes h
.
dug as
showing “first-hand knowledge of an incident” or an “eye-witness account of
an event”. This survey of previous scholarship on h
.
dug makes clear that there
is a widespread consensus that h
.
dug is a sensory evidential.
Although all of the examples of h
.
dug presented in this summary of previous
literature are 3rd person, when semantically called for h
.
dug is used with any of
the three persons. Use with the 3rd person is most common because one rarely
has need to invoke sensory perception of the speaker or the addressee. How-
ever, when context calls for such uses they are not eschewed. Several examples
of the testimonial with the 1st person are discussed below; cf. (28), (40a, b),
(41). Here are two examples of h
.
dug used with the 2nd person.
(19) a. khyed-ran˙-la
you-obl
ca-lag
things
gan˙-yan˙
whatever
h
.
dug
have-tes
‘You have everything [all kinds of things].’ (Chonjore 2003: 131)
b. khyed-ran˙-tsho
you-plr
dpeh
.
i
very
yag-po
good
h
.
dug
are-tes
‘You are extremely / really very good.’ (Chonjore 2003: 131)
In sentence (19b) the speaker compliments the addressee by saying that the
speaker himself has direct evidence of the addressee’s goodness, rather than
merely knowing of his goodness by reputation. The use of h
.
dug with any of
the three persons shows that it is a mistake to analyse it as part of a con-
junct/disjunct system (cf. Tournadre 2008 contra DeLancey 1990, 1992, 2001).
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2.3. Possible objections to the traditional account: h
.
dug in future and hearsay
contexts
Two contexts in which h
.
dug occurs may at first blush appear difficult to anal-
yse in terms of sensory evidence. The “Lhasa” Tibetan testimonial does not
occur in the future tense. Instead, sentences in the future are restricted to per-
sonal and factual forms (Tournadre 1996: 245, Garrett 2001: 65–66). This lack
of a testimonial future is quite natural; it is impossible to directly perceive fu-
ture events through the senses. However, there is one construction using h
.
dug,
which could be understood as referring to future time.
(20) de-rin˙
today
ñi-ma
sun
skyid-po
pleasant
ltas-pa-h
.
dug
appear-tes
‘Today the weather will be good.’ (Garrett 2001: 90, cf. Agha 1993:
227)
Such usage does not conflict with the analysis of h
.
dug as a sensory evidential.
As Agha explains, in such cases there is “a direct appeal to an external or
‘objective’ evidentiary sign which serves as the warrant for the prediction”
(Agha 1993: 227 quoted in Garrett 2001: 90). An English translation which
captures this meaning might be ‘It looks like it will be nice and sunny today’.
In the second usage which seems at odds with sensory evidence, h
.
dug is
used with the 1st person to indicate hearsay.
(21) a. 1959-la
1959-in
n˙a
me
chun˙-chun˙
small
red
is-fac
/ de-dus
that-time
n˙a
me
a-ma-lags
mother
mñam-du
together
lha-sar
Lhasa-in
h
.
dug
exist-tes
‘In 1959 I was young. At that time I was in Lhasa with [my]
mother.’ [she told me] (Chonjore 2003: 129)
b. n˙a
me
sn˙on-ma
previous
slob-grwar
at.school
yod-dus
was-time
slob-sbyon˙
study
yag-po
good
byed-kyi-mi-h
.
dug
do-prs-not-tes
‘I didn’t study well when I went [used to go] to school.’ [my
father told me] (Chonjore 2003: 186)
Such examples are instances of indirect discourse. Because his parents wit-
nessed their son’s youth it is natural for them to report facts about his child-
hood with the testimonial. When the speaker restates these sentences in indirect
discourse, he leaves unchanged the original evidential marking. Although pro-
nouns are realigned in “Lhasa” Tibetan indirect discourse, evidential markers
are not realigned (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 215).
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(22) a. n˙a
me
em-chi
doctor
yin
is-per
‘I am a doctor.’
b. khon˙
he
em-chi
doctor
red
is-fac
‘He is a doctor.’
c. khon˙
he
em-chi
doctor
yin
is-per
zer
rsm
lab-son˙
said-pst-tes
‘Hei says hei is a doctor.’ (cf. Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 214–216)
In cases where more context is provided, this context makes clear that indirect
discourse is the correct interpretation of such apparent instances of hearsay.
(23) n˙a
me
lha-sar
Lhasa-obl
bsdad-dus
stay-time
tshon˙-khan˙-gi
store-gen
las-ka
work
byed-kyi-h
.
dug
do-prs-tes
a-ma-lags-kyis
mother-erg
n˙ar
me-obl
h
.
di-h
.
dra
like-this
gsun˙-gi-h
.
dug
say-prs-tes
‘When I was living in Lhasa [I] was working in a store. My mother
told me that.’ (Chonjore 2003: 189)
The use of h
.
dug in future and hearsay contexts is fully consistent with this
morpheme’s overall meaning as a sensory evidential.
2.4. DeLancey’s presentation of h
.
dug: Mirativity
DeLancey has not published a complete account of his understanding of h
.
dug
or its place in the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system overall. Across his publica-
tions he sometimes gives contradictory accounts without stating which of his
former views he no longer holds. For example, although he writes that “the
mirative distinction [. . . ] can be made only for first persons” (DeLancey 1997:
45), one of the examples he initially used to introduce mirativity is the 3rd per-
son sentence ‘There are yaks in Tibet’ (DeLancey 1986: 205). In the absence of
an overall account of DeLancey’s views, a historical survey of his contributions
will serve best to characterise his understanding of h
.
dug.
In his first contribution treating the semantics of h
.
dug DeLancey (1985: 70)
presents yod and h
.
dug as instances of “direct” knowledge and yod-pa-red as
showing “indirect” knowledge. In a contribution from 1986 he further spec-
ifies this contrast as one of “old/new knowledge” but not yet using the term
“mirative”, which makes its début in DeLancey’s writings in 1992. In that pa-
per however he mentions a conference presentation on “mirativity” from 1989.
In articles in 1997 and 2001 DeLancey shifts his focus from the description of
h
.
dug in “Lhasa” Tibetan to the promotion of “mirativity” as a crosslinguisti-
cally valid category of which h
.
dug is but one instance.
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DeLancey acknowledges Goldstein & Nornang’s comment that h
.
dug “con-
structions imply actual visual knowledge” (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 23
quoted in DeLancey 1986: 205), but presents the following pair of examples
which he states prove that “eyewitness knowledge is not the relevant criterion”
(DeLancey 1986: 205).
(24) a. Bod-la
Tibet-obl
g.yag
yak
yod
exist-per
‘There are yaks in Tibet.’
b. Bod-la
Tibet-obl
g.yag
yak
h
.
dug
exist-tes
‘There are yaks in Tibet.’ (DeLancey 1986: 204)
DeLancey (1986: 205) points out that “[a]lthough both sentences are gram-
matical, a Tibetan, who has actual visual knowledge of the presence of yaks
in Tibet cannot use h
.
dug to report this fact”, and therefore suggests that the
important factor is not “the source of the speaker’s knowledge, but rather its
relative novelty” (DeLancey 1986: 205), which explains why the second sen-
tence is appropriate as “a response of someone who was fascinated with yaks
but knew nothing of where they existed until visiting Tibet and encountering
one” (DeLancey 1986: 205). As Garrett (2001: 102–103) observes, the trans-
lation DeLancey provides for example (24a) is in error; possible translation
include ‘I have yaks in Tibet’ or ‘My yaks are in Tibet’.
DeLancey sees a confirmation for his analysis in the use of h
.
dug with the 1st
person, which often includes a sense of astonishment.
(25) a. n˙ah
.
i
me-gen
khan˙-la
house-obl
z´i-mi
cat
yod
exist-per
‘There’s a cat in my house.’ (DeLancey 1986: 212)
b. n˙ah
.
i
me-gen
khan˙-la
house-obl
z´i-mi
cat
h
.
dug
exist-tes
‘There’s a cat in my house.’ (DeLancey 2001: 373)
In the first example “the cat is presumably mine” (DeLancey 1986: 212)
whereas the context for the second is that “I come home and unexpectedly
find a strange cat wandering about” (DeLancey 1986: 212).
In 1992, at the point where he introduces the term “mirative”, DeLancey
refers to the following two sentences, quoted here from his more thorough
presentation of mirativiy in 1997.
(26) a. n˙ar
me-obl
dn˙ul
money
tog-tsam
some
yod
exist-per
‘I have some money [e.g., I brought some with me].’ (DeLancey
1997: 44, cf. DeLancey 1992: 44)
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b. n˙ar
me-obl
dn˙ul
money
tog-tsam
some
h
.
dug
exist-tes
‘I have some money [quite to my surprise]!’ (DeLancey 1997:
44, cf. DeLancey 1992: 44)
In his most recent contribution on the topic DeLancey adds one further pair of
example sentences:
(27) a. n˙ar
me-obl
deb
book
de
that
yod
exist-per
‘I have that book.’
b. n˙ar
me-obl
deb
book
de
that
h
.
dug
exist-tes
‘I have that book.’ (DeLancey 2001: 374)
The first example can be said “in answer to someone asking me whether I
own a particular book” (DeLancey 2001: 374), whereas the second is more
appropriate if, believing I did not own the book, “I returned home and found it
on my shelf” (DeLancey 2001: 374).
All of DeLancey’s examples of h
.
dug as a mirative marker are instances of
this morpheme as an existential verb. He does not however make clear whether
he thinks this semantic description applies only to this one syntactic use, or
rather is characteristic of h
.
dug in general. His hypothesis that conjunct/disjunct
systems derive from mirativity (DeLancey 1992: 57) suggests perhaps that mi-
rativity is characteristic of h
.
dug in all contexts.
2.5. The case against “mirativity” in Tibetan
I generally do not disagree with DeLancey’s interpretation of the meaning of
the sentences he cites. However, the characterization of h
.
dug as ‘new infor-
mation’ is incorrect. Although this description captures part of the meaning of
some examples, it is inadequate to capture the Gesamtbedeutung of this mor-
pheme, and is flatly contradicted by some examples. Even those examples most
susceptible to analysis in terms of “mirativity” have been equally convincingly
explained through an analysis of h
.
dug as a sensory evidential.
2.5.1. “Mirativity” leaves some examples of h
.
dug unaccounted for. Several
examples clearly demonstrate that h
.
dug reports visual information even when
the information reported is in no way new. Consequently, even if h
.
dug encodes
“mirativity” this category insufficiently accounts for the morpheme’s use to
suggest the independence of “mirativity” from “evidentiality” as a grammatical
category.
Denwood (1999: 150) points out that a verb “+gi- h
.
dug with first-person
subject is unusual, but is heard in cases where the speaker is seeing him/herself
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from an outside viewpoint, for instance in a film, photograph, or dream” (Den-
wood 1999: 150). He provides the following example:
(28) n˙as
/`ngää
me-erg
las-ka
`läg@
work
byed-kyi h
.
dug
`chiigIduu/
do-prs-tes
‘I (saw that I) was working (in my dream).’ (Denwood 1999: 150)
At the moment of reporting a dream to someone else the information in the
dream is no longer new or surprising. In this example therefore h
.
dug cannot
be analysed as a “mirative” marker. The reason for the use of h
.
dug in such as
example is that I have come to know about my working through seeing it in a
dream. Visual evidence alone is sufficient to account for the semantics of this
example.
In the case of involuntary verbs of experience used for the 1st person h
.
dug
is the default option. In a well-known case acknowledged by DeLancey the
normal way of reporting illness is with h
.
dug.
(29) n˙a
me
na-gi-h
.
dug
sick-prs-tes
‘I’m sick.’ (DeLancey 1985: 66, 1986: 207, cf. also Tournadre 1996:
225, Garrett 2001: 79)
It would be hard to argue that whenever someone uttered the sentence ‘I am
sick’ he is stressing the novelty of this information.
DeLancey appears to believe that h
.
dug is called for in this case because
illness is “beyond control” (1986: 207), whereas yod is used with verbs “which
require some degree of control on the part of the subject” (1986: 207).
(30) n˙a
me
las-ka
work
byed-kyi-yod
do-prs-per
‘I’m working.’ (DeLancey 1986: 207)
An account of h
.
dug versus yod in terms of the controllability of the action
is however not posssible, because as Denwood points out, na ‘to be sick’ is
compatible with the suffix gi-yod.
(31) a. n˙a
/`nga
me
na-gi-yod
`n2g@yöö/
sick-prs-per
‘I’m chronically sick.’ (Denwood 1999: 151, cf. Tournadre 1996:
223)18
18. DeLancey, probably overlooking this interpretation, suggests that this sentence is ungrammat-
ical (DeLancey 1990: 300, example 28).
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b. n˙a
/`nga
me
na-gi-h
.
dug
`n2g@duu/
sick-prs-tes
‘I’m sick at the moment.’ (Denwood 1999: 151)
Denwood introduces the feature of “generality” to account for such exam-
ples.19 This new category is however also unnecessary. The morpheme yod
is employed to mark information which one knows through direct personal
(usually intentional) involvement whereas h
.
dug marks information which one
comes to know through the senses. Saying n˙a na-gi-yod suggests that one has
come to know of one’s illness in a similar way to how one knows of one’s own
actions or long term acquaintances.
(32) a. n˙a
me
yi-ge
letter
h
.
bri-gi-yod
write-prs-per
‘I am writing a letter.’ (cf. Tournadre 2003: 133)
b. khon˙
him
n˙o-s´es-gi-yod
recognize-prs-per
‘I know him.’ (cf. Tournadre 2003: 189–191)20
If one says n˙a na-gi-h
.
dug it shows that one knows one’s illness through direct
experience; such examples either reflect an internal sense (endopathic, cf. Tour-
nadre 1996: 226, Garrett 2001: 77–82) or illness is grammatically something
that one realizes with the senses, like the presence of a stray cat.
The examples of illness and dreams show that h
.
dug does not always coin-
cide with “mirative” meanings. In contrast, sensory evidence is fully sufficient
to account for these examples. Mirativity is at best insufficient to capture the
meaning of h
.
dug.
2.5.2. “Sensory evidence” suffices to account for all of DeLancey’s examples.
Even if h
.
dug occurs in a number of circumstances which cannot be analysed
as “new information”, the category could perhaps be salvaged if it is required
in some, albeit not all cases. In fact, all of DeLancey’s examples, surprise at
yaks, cats, money, and books, are better explained as visual evidence. Yukawa
explains three of DeLancey’s examples (books, yaks, money) in exactly this
way.
19. In the case of yod, yod-pa-red, and h
.
dug used with involuntary verbs Denwood (1999: 150)
provides six classifications based on four factors, viz. “person”, “evidentiality”, “viewpoint”,
and “generality”. He gives equally elaborate analysis of these morphemes with voluntary
verbs (Denwood 1999: 149) and as copulas (Denwood 1999: 124). While this analysis ex-
plains the use of these morphemes in a very wide number of contexts it is needlessly complex.
20. These two examples do not fully characterise the meaning of yod, which is unnecessary for
the topic at hand. For more detail consult Tournadre (1996: 223–224, 2003: 145).
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In (15), Yukawa’s example of two people discussing books in a shop, yod-
pa-red is used when the knowledge is derived from reputation (15a) whereas
h
.
dug is used when one has physically set eyes on a book (15b). In contrast,
DeLancey’s example of a book (27) employs yod when the speaker is describ-
ing the content of his own library (27a) and h
.
dug when he is shocked to find
a particular book on his shelf (27b). Yukawa’s explanation of h
.
dug to show
visual evidence can easily account for DeLancey’s example. When describing
the content of my library, as in (27a), I know which books I have because I
was directly involved in their procurement. Because of this direct personal in-
volvement the “personal” verb yod is called for. When describing my shock at
the discovery that I own a particular book, as in (27b), my knowledge comes
not from my personal involvement (which I have lost track of) but rather from
the visual evidence of the book on my shelf. The implication of surprise arises
as a result of using a sensory evidential in a circumstance when the use of the
personal would be more conventional.
Yukawa (1966: 79) interprets DeLancey’s example of yaks, not as showing
new information, but rather as showing that h
.
dug “は過去のことについても
そのままの形で用いられう [can be used in the same form with reference to
a past event]”.
(33) bod-la
/ˆpöö la
Tibet-obl
g.yag
´yaP
yak
man˙-po
`manggo
many
h
.
dug
duu/
exist-tes
‘チベットにはヤクが多い. [In Tibet there are many Yaks.]’
(Yukawa 1966: 79)
Such sentences occur in “過去にその事物を見た（は他の感覚で認識
した）場合 [situations where one has seen (or recognized through another
sense) that thing in the past]” (Yukawa 1966: 79). Visual evidence, not new
information, is key. DeLancey’s observation (1986: 205) that “a Tibetan, who
has actual visual knowledge of the presence of yaks in Tibet cannot use h
.
dug
to report this fact” misunderstands the relationship among the three-termed ev-
idential system. A Tibetan would normally know of the presence of yaks in
Tibet, through his personal involvement, through the general knowledge avail-
able to him and his culture, and through direct sensory observation. Yet when
uttering a sentence he must choose exactly one of these three means of knowl-
edge to present to his audience as the source of his information. It is certainly
not the case that h
.
dug must be used obligatorily for all situations for which
one has sensory evidence, far from this proving that h
.
dug is not a sensory evi-
dential it demonstrates only that sometimes there is more than one way to say
something. By presenting his knowledge of yaks in Tibet as deriving from the
evidence of his senses a speaker implies a lack of personal involvement or gen-
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eral knowledge; it is this implication which results in the connotation of “new
information”.
In the case of money, Yukawa gives the following example to demonstrate
that the bearing witness through the senses marked by h
.
dug can occur based
on senses (in this case touch) other than the visual.
(34) h
.
dir
/`dee
here
dn˙ul
´ngüü
money
h
.
dug
duu/
exist-tes
‘ここにお金がある. [Here is some money.]’ (Yukawa 1966: 79)
A person usually knows that he has money because he put it in his pocket
himself (26a). But sometimes, having forgotten he has done so, he learns that
he has money in his pocket form the sensory evidence of touching it (26b, 34).
In those cases where “new information” is included in the pragmatic use of a
sentence containing h
.
dug it is contextually derived from its opposition to the
other epistemic moods. Rather than a grammatical category in its own right
“mirativity” is a pragmatic effect in certain uses of sensory evidence.
An implication of surprise arising from the presentation of knowledge as de-
riving from visual evidence occurs in English just like in Tibetan. This is clear
if one translates DeLancey’s examples n˙ar dn˙ul tog-tsam h
.
dug (DeLancey
1997: 44) and n˙ah
.
i nan˙-la z´i-mi h
.
dug as ‘I see I have some money’ and ‘I
see there’s a cat in my house’ or Bod-la g.yag h
.
dug ‘I see there are yaks in
Tibet’. In these English sentences the visual component of the evidence is ob-
vious from the etymological meaning of the verb see, however, the pragmatic
force of such a sentence is not to comment on what I see, but rather to em-
phasize the shock of either having money or there being a cat in the house.
One would usually know about one’s money or cat because it is one’s business
to know; one would usually know about the fauna of Tibet because it is well
known. By invoking sensory evidence instead of one of the other potential ev-
idential categories the speaker emphasizes that he did not expect what he sees.
The grammatical meaning of h
.
dug is sensory evidence, not new or surprising
information.
2.6. Conclusion
The morpheme h
.
dug is an evidential. Although it is most characteristically
used for visual evidence,21 it can also be used with sound (16), taste (18a),
21. If one saw “mirative” as derived from Latin miro¯ ‘I see’ it would be an apt term for the
Tibetan testimonial. However, “mirative” in fact is derived by clipping “admirative”, itself
derived from admiro¯ ‘to wonder’. This terminology appears to originate in Dozon’s Alba-
nian grammar, in which he uses “admiratif” as a translation for προσδχητοι ‘unexpected’
(Dozon 1879: 226).
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touch (34), and smell.22 When used in a context where another modal auxiliary
would be expected it can have an implication of surprise. This implication is
however not a part of the morpheme’s grammatical meaning.
DeLancey himself accepted visual evidence as the meaning of h
.
dug in 1985
writing that “the sentences with the direct gloss report information which
the speaker has obtained through direct sensory perception (through any sense
channel)” (DeLancey 1985: 65).
(35) bsod-nams-gyis
Sonam-erg
thang-ga
thangka
h
.
gel-gyi-h
.
dug
hang-prs-tes
‘Sonam is hanging a thangka/thangkas [direct perception].’
(DeLancey 1985: 65)
It appears that in 1986 DeLancey became aware of several examples which
made him change his mind. After finding discussions of “admirative” and “mi-
rative” in other languages, he chose to analyse h
.
dug in similar terms. Unbe-
knownst to DeLancey, Yukawa had already analysed in terms of “visual ev-
idence” the same examples which turned DeLancey against visual evidence.
Subsequent typological research, such as Aikhenvald (2004), has accepted
DeLancey’s account of h
.
dug at face value without recourse to the larger body
of secondary literature on h
.
dug.
In her survey of morphological categories used for mirative meaning Aikhen-
vald (2004: 210) concludes that “any evidential except for visual and firsthand,
can acquire mirative extensions”. In fact, “Lhasa” Tibetan h
.
dug, the touchstone
for the entire typological discussion of mirativity, is a visual and first-hand
evidential which has acquired mirative extensions; h
.
dug is a highly atypical
example of the very category invented to describe it.
3. Mirativity in other languages
Under the influence of DeLancey’s writings morphemes in many languages
are now thought of as mirative markers; it is not feasible to discuss and re-
fute every such case in an article of reasonable length. Instead, it must suffice
to treat the terminological antecedents of DeLancey’s use of “mirativity” and
the phenomena outside of Tibetan which he describes as mirative. In order to
give due consideration to arguments for mirativity presented after DeLancey’s
(2001) most recent relevant contribution, an additional section considers the
phenomena which Aikhenvald (2004) connects with mirativity.
22. I have not come across an example with smell discussed in the previous literature. In a letter
however (12 April 2010), Nicolas Tournadre draws my attention to this example: dri-ma kha-
gi-h
.
dug ‘The odour is bitter.’
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3.1. Antecedents of DeLancey’s mirativity
DeLancey associates his description of h
.
dug as a “mirative” in Tibetan, with
previous descriptions of the “admirative” in Albanian and the “mirative” in
Washo. If one investigates the “admirative” and “mirative” in these two lan-
guages this similarity disappears. Friedman (1986: 180), whom DeLancey
cites, writes as follows about the admirative in Albanian:
Although the admirative is traditionally defined as a mood expressing surprise, it
is also used to express irony, doubt, reportedness, etc. In all its uses the admirative
somehow refers to the speaker’s present or past nonconfirmation of the truth of a
statement.
In an earlier paper Friedman (1981: 12) writes more explicitly of the Albanian
admirative that “surprise is clearly not its basic or invariant meaning”. The
following example demonstrates that both surprise and first-hand testimony
are not the core meanings of the Albanian admirative.
(36) në lidhje me pohimi që forma analitike e përmbysur e tipit “qëne kam”
paska pasur dikur vlerën e së ardhmes
‘in connection with the idea that the inverted analytic form of the type
“qëne kam” was supposed to have had at one time the value of the
future’ (Friedman 1982: 22)
In (36) “the author is using the perfect admirative paska pasur in a quota-
tive fashion which emphasizes his nonacceptance of the truth of what he is
reporting without irony or sarcasm” (Friedman 1982: 22). In his most recent
contribution on the Albanian admirative, Friedman (2003: 190) refers to it as
“nonconfirmative”, “for which ‘surprise’ (mirativity) is one of the contextual
variant meanings” (Friedman 2003: 192).23 The admirative in Albanian, re-
porting the nonconfirmation of the speaker, is the direct opposite of h
.
dug in
Tibetan which indicates explicitly that the speaker can confirm the truth of a
statement with his senses.
Jacobsen (1964: 630) writes that in Washo the mirative “indicates that the
speaker knows of the action described by the verb, not from having observed it
occur, but only inferentially from observation of its effects”.
(37) dímeP Píhu ´káPyiPi
‘The spring has dried up.’ (Jacobsen 1964: 630)
23. If “nonconfirmation” is the basic meaning of the Albanian admirative, it is a bit surprising that
Friedman’s examples include direct observation on the basis of vision (2003: 197, example
15), smell (2003: 197, example 16), and taste (2003: 200, example 23). Perhaps, following the
implication of Friedman’s discussion of Turkish as comparable to Albanian, one may suggest
that Albanian like Turkish exhibits a “mediative” (Lazard 1999) or “indirective” (Johanson
2000) meaning rather than “nonconfirmation” per se (see Section 3.2.4 below).
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The Washo “mirative” exists in paradigmatic contrast to “visual” and “auda-
tive” evidentials (Jacobsen 1964: 626–629). Again, in direct contrast to Tibetan
the Washo mirative implies lack of observation rather than direct sensory per-
ception. Inference is one use of Tibetan h
.
dug among many, but in Tibetan the
interpretation of inference is a consequence of combining the evidential mean-
ing of direct witness with the perfect tense. Aikhenvald (2004: 210) concludes
that the Washo mirative is not a mirative in DeLancey’s sense, but rather an
“inferential evidential”.
DeLancey accepts and cites the analyses of Friedman and Jacobsen and
builds his own conception of “mirativity” in Tibetan on analogy to their de-
scriptions. However, not only is there no ground for such an analogy; the
admirative in Albanian and mirative in Washo are quite at odds with the
meaning of “Lhasa” Tibetan h
.
dug. Tibetan h
.
dug reports the sense experience
of the speaker, the Albanian admirative and Washo mirative report the non-
confirmation or lack of observation; none of the three exhibit a grammatical
category for surprise or new information; none of the three are mirative mark-
ers.
3.2. DeLancey’s other examples of mirativity
In his 1997 article proposing mirativity as a crosslinguistic category, in ad-
dition to Tibetan, DeLancey discusses evidence from Hare, Sunwar, Korean,
Turkish, and Kalasha, and lists but does not discuss “several languages with
mirative-like constructions” (DeLancey 1997: 47).24 Even if Tibetan h
.
dug is
not a mirative marker, and neither the “admirative” in Albanian nor the “mira-
tive” in Washo are mirative markers, perhaps the evidence DeLancey presents
from these five languages compels the acknowledgement of an independent
grammatical category to encode the speaker’s surprise.
3.2.1. Hare. According to DeLancey the Hare suffix -lõ is typically used in
inferential and hearsay contexts, but can be used with mirative force when a
person directly perceives an event (DeLancey 1997: 38). All of the examples
which DeLancey provides are easily accounted for in terms of visual evidence.
(38) júhye
hereabout
sa
bear
k’ínayeda
walk.around.impf
lõ
lõ
‘I see there was a bear walking around here.’ (DeLancey 1997: 38, cf.
DeLancey 2001: 375)
24. Several of the Hare examples reoccur in his 2001 article.
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated | 128.103.149.52
Download Date | 2/5/13 11:52 PM
410 Nathan W. Hill
As DeLancey’s English translation indicates, lõ could as easily indicate that
the source of the information is visual evidence as to indicate that the stated
conclusion required inference.
(39) libo
cup
sı˜tł’
drop.perf
lõ
lõ
‘I dropped a cup.’ (DeLancey 1997: 39)
Example (39) can be used “if the speaker were watching TV with a cup in her
hand, and when the show was over looked down and saw the cup on the floor,
without having been aware of it slipping from her grasp” (DeLancey 1997:
39). DeLancey notices that lõ is used with the 1st person only with “a context
involving inattention or lack of consciousness” (DeLancey 1997: 38). The in-
terpretation of lõ as a sensory evidential accounts sensibly for such usage. It
is only when one acts involuntarily that it is sensible to describe sense precep-
tion as the source of the knowledge of one’s own actions. Unsurprisingly, the
Tibetan testimonial (son˙ rather than h
.
dug being the marker in the past tense) is
also used to describe the speaker’s unobserved or accidental actions.
(40) a. n˙as
/`ngäP
I-erg
s´a
´sha
meat
bzas-son˙
`säP-song/
ate-pst-tes
‘(Dammit) I ate meat.’ (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 167)
b. n˙as
/`ngäP
h
.
bu
`pu
bsad-son˙
´säP-song/
I-erg insect killed-pst-tes
‘I killed an insect [accidentally].’ (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 167)
DeLancey (1997: 45) notes this use of the Tibetan testimonial in an exam-
ple which is very similar to the Hare example (39). Without noting the sim-
ilarity between the two examples, he analyses the Hare example as inference
(DeLancey 1997: 39), whereas the Tibetan example he analyses as mirative
(DeLancey 1997: 45).
(41) n˙as
I-erg
ja
tea
bos-son˙
spilled-pst-tes
‘I spilled tea [inadvertently].’ (DeLancey 1997: 45)
I interpret the similarity between (39) and (41) as showing that both Hare lõ
and the testimonial in Tibetan encode visual evidence.
In the following example, an ogre is speaking about a man who had been
throwing branches at him. DeLancey presents this sentence in order to show
that inference or hearsay cannot sufficiently account for Hare lõ and instead
mirativity is at play.
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(42) heee,
hey
gúhde
up.there
daweda!
sit
ch’ifi
guy
dach’ída
sit
lõ!
lõ
‘Heey, (he’s) sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!’ (DeLancey
1997: 39, cf. DeLancey 2001: 376)
Although it is not possible to see lõ as a marker of inference of hearsay, because
“the context explicitly makes clear that the sentence reports direct perception
on the part of the speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 39), there is no obstacle to analyse
lõ as a sensory evidential.
Other examples which DeLancey points to as mirative are equally well ac-
counted for by sensory evidence.
(43) Mary
Mary
e-wé’
its-hide
ghálayeda
work.impf
lõ
lõ
‘Mary is working on hides.’ (DeLancey 1997: 39, cf. DeLancey 2001:
376)
Such a sentence is most plausible “when the speaker has just gone to Mary’s
house and found her working on a hide” (DeLancey 1997: 39). Although he
emphasizes the newness of the information, DeLancey (1997: 39) explicitly
mentions that in such an example “the speaker has first-hand knowledge”.25
Sentences in which the actor is 2nd person “virtually always have the sense
of surprise at an unanticipated situation” (DeLancey 2001: 376).
(44) e-wé’
its-hide
ghálayı˜da
work.2sg.subj.impf
lõ
lõ
‘I see you’re working on hides.’ (DeLancey 2001: 376)
In this example, again the English translation draws attention to the possibility
lõ encodes visual evidence rather than surprise. The fact that “a statement about
the addressee is generally conversationally relevant only if it is new informa-
tion to the speaker” (DeLancey 2001: 376) is what gives the visual evidential
its connotation of surprise, i.e., mirativity is a pragmatic effect and not a com-
ponent of the grammatical meaning.
DeLancey finds compliments particularly diagnostic of mirativity, but in this
situation also sensory evidence is equally persuasive.
(45) deshı˜ta
bush
yedaníyie
smart
lõ
lõ
25. Although first-hand knowledge is present in all of the examples of Hare lõ provided here,
Aikhenvald (2004: 197) analyzes the morpheme as a “non-firsthand marker” which can be
used “to cover new information”. She does not elaborate on the reasons for her analysis.
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‘You’re smart for the bush [i.e., are competent at bushcraft and good
at dealing improvisatorily with situation that come up in the wild]!’
(DeLancey 1997: 40, cf. DeLancey 2001: 377)
DeLancey (1997: 40) suggests that such a sentence “might be said to some-
one who has just demonstrated more wilderness knowledge than the speaker
thought”. I am unfamiliar with the social mores of the Hare, but if lõ is indeed
a marker of “new information” its use in compliments would always suggest
low initial expectations and consequently only shabby compliments of the “not
bad for a girl” variety. I instead suggest that lõ indicates that the speaker can
testify to what he is complimenting through first-hand experience. A simple
test could adjudicate between DeLancey’s analysis and that proposed here. A
Hare speaker attends a concert of Itzhak Perlman playing the Paganini solo vi-
olin caprices and, introduced to Mr Perlman at a reception after the concert,
says ‘You play the violin well’. Mr Perlman’s skill at the violin is not new in-
formation. DeLancey would predict that lõ would not be grammatical in this
sentence, whereas if lõ is a sensory evidential, it would be called for in this
compliment also.
DeLancey does not give an example of lõ to mark hearsay. Rice (1989: 410)
describes one use of this morpheme as ‘apparently, reported, uncertainty’. The
four examples she gives of this usage however in her own explanation rely on
visual (46a, b, c) or auditory evidence (46d).26
(46) a. t’ası˛´
something
whehkw’e˛´le
3.hears.neg
lo˛´
dub
‘s/he apparently does not hear anything’ [accompanying a picture
of a sleeping boy and a raven crowing] (Rice 1989: 410)
b. Pabá
father
mı˛´
net
dahetl’i˛
3.is.setting
lo˛´
dub
‘my father is apparently setting nets’ [accompanying a picture
where the man seems to be setting nets, but since the speaker is
not there, he could be doing something else] (Rice 1989: 410)
c. Margaret
Margaret
ledí
tea
Pariyuné
all
xadéhts’e
3.drank.up
no˛´
dub
‘Margaret apparently drank up the tea.’ [the speaker sees that
there is no more tea and surmises that since Margaret is the only
one around, she must have been the one to drink it] (Rice 1989:
410)
26. (46c, d) come from another dialect in which the same morpheme is pronounced no˛´.
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d. Peyáhdi
ball
netsilia
3.is.small
nágokeyee
3pl.play
no˛´
dub
‘They are apparently playing Indian ball’ [speaker can hear the
ball game and guesses that a ball game is going on] (Rice 1989:
411)27
Rice describes lõ as an evidential, giving examples of inference (1989: 408–
409, examples 39 through 46), i.e., where it “specifies that the outcome of an
event is an observed fact although the event that actually lead up to this out-
come was not itself observed” (Rice 1989: 408) and involuntary 1st person
action (Rice 1989: 409–410, examples 50 through 54). In addition, she gives
three examples (Rice 1989: 409, examples 47 through 49) in which lõ “indi-
cates that some activity other than the one that had been expected will take
place” (Rice 1989: 409). This usage appears to come close to mirativity. How-
ever, since none of DeLancey’s examples of lõ (or other morphemes which he
analyses as a mirative) refer to future time, it is hard to know whether he would
analyse these examples as miratives.
(47) hi˛dú
now
xéhts’e˛´
evening
sho
show
Padee
3.go
gha
comp
sóni˛
doubt
yenehwhe˛
1sg.think
i˛lé
pst
Peyáhdi
ball
hé
with
nágokeyee
3pl.play
gha
fut
no˛
evidential
‘I thought that there would be a show this evening but they’ll play ball
instead.’ (Rice 1989: 409)
Such a usage is still consistent with an explanation in terms of sensory evi-
dence. One makes a prediction about the future on the basis of visual evidence,
similarly to the Tibetan example (20) predicting the weather. Such an analysis
is made clear by a translation like ‘I thought that there would be a show this
evening but it looks like they will play ball instead’.
All of DeLancey’s and Rice’s examples of lõ, whether indicating direct ob-
servation, a compliment, future predictions, inference, or involuntary 1st per-
son actions, can be explained as examples of sensory evidence. Hearsay might
be difficult to explain as sensory evidence, but conveniently no examples of
hearsay are available. It is best to conclude that, like h
.
dug in Tibetan, lõ is a
sensory evidential.
3.2.2. Sunwar. DeLancey’s evidence for mirativity in Sunwar comes from
the distinction between two copula verbs /tsh@/ and /´baak-/. Whereas /tsh@/
“indicates a proposition which the speaker knows simply because he knows
27. Compare the very similar Tibetan example (16).
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it” /´baak-/ expresses “information which the speaker knows only by recent
discovery” (DeLancey 1997: 41).
(48) a. Tangka
Tangka
Kathmandu-m
Kathmandu-loc
tshaa
tsh@.3sg
‘Tangka is in Kathmandu.’ (DeLancey 1997: 41)
b. Tangka
Tangka
Kathmandu-m
Kathmandu-loc
´baâ-t@
exist-3sg.pst
‘Tangka is in Kathmandu.’ (DeLancey 1997: 42)
While (48a) “could be said by someone who has been living in Kathmandu, and
is aware that Tangka has been there for some time” (DeLancey 1997: 41), (48b)
“would be said by someone who had seen Tangka in Kathmandu, not having
known previously that he was there” (DeLancey 1997: 41), or in some cases
when this information has been gained through hearsay. DeLancey singles out
as an example “a situation in which the speaker has just learned of Tangka’s
whereabouts through a telephone conversation” (DeLancey 1997: 42). He does
not specify how long after the speaker has learned of Tangka’s whereabouts
sentence (48b) remains grammatical. If two weeks after seeing Tangka or learn-
ing of his whereabouts through a telephone conversation a speaker is still per-
mitted to say (48b), the morpheme /´baak-/ does not express “new information”
in the same sense as an exclamation of surprise at seeing a strange cat in one’s
home (25b) or a strange book on one’s shelf (26b). Seeing Tangka with one’s
own eyes can be accounted for by analysing /´baak-/ as a sensory evidential
in (48b). Such an analysis also accounts for the following example, which is
comparable to example (28) of Tibetan h
.
dug given above.
(49) go
I
Kathmandu-m
Kathmandu-loc
´baâ-ti
exist-1sg.pst
‘I saw myself in Kathmandu [as in a dream].’ (DeLancey 1997: 42)
In this instance DeLancey chooses to express the component of visual evidence
in his translation and admits that “we associate evidentiality” (DeLancey 1997:
42) with such examples. However, for reasons he does not make explicit he
prefers to analyse this example as mirative. It is not possible to understand a
dream as new information at the time of relating it another person, and for this
reason I gave example (28) of Tibetan h
.
dug as counterevidence to DeLancey’s
account of mirativity in Tibetan.
Mirativity in Sunwar has not been confirmed in more recent work; in her
Sunwar grammar Dörte Borchers writes that his “analysis of the difference
between the copulas ba¯ca¯ and cha does not fit the data collected from speakers
of Sunwar from Ra¯mecha¯p” (Borchers 2008: 164). I conclude that mirativity
is no more helpful in describing Sunwar /´baak-/ than it was in accounting for
the use of Tibetan h
.
dug or Hare lõ.
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3.2.3. Korean. DeLancey’s evidence for mirativity in Korean is drawn from
the analysis of the morpheme -kun by Ho Sang Lee (1985, 1993) and
Kyounghee Ko (1989). Of these three sources only Lee (1993) is available to
me. DeLancey (1997: 45) stresses the following two examples as “illustrating
the irrelevance of evidential categories per se to the use of -kun”.
(50) a. cikûm
now
i
this
sikan
hour
oppa-nûn
brother-top
class-e
class-loc
tûlô-ka
enter-go
iss-kess-kun
be-conj-ni
[A note left by someone who had come to visit the addressee
and found him not at home:] ‘Right now, you must be in class.’
(DeLancey 1997: 45, after Lee 1993: 147)
b. c@ny’@k
dinner
tW-si-nWn-kun-yo
take-hon-pres-ni-def
[Said by a visitor who enters the house to find the family at din-
ner:] ‘(I see) you are eating dinner.’ (DeLancey 1997: 45)
Both of these sentences are easily interpreted as cases of visual evidence.
DeLancey’s translation of (50b) suggests this immediately and a translation
such as ‘I see you must be in class now’ for (50a) demonstrates that in English
as much as in Korean, the visual evidence of a person’s absence can in an ap-
propriate context constitute evidence that the person is in some specific other
place. Lee himself explicitly adds either ‘I see’ or ‘I saw’ to the glosses of six
of the eight examples of -kun he discusses (his examples 17f, 19h, 22, 23, 24,
25).28 The description of -kun as a sensory evidential coincides with Sohn’s
account that -kun “denotes one’s instantaneous perception” (Sohn 1999: 356).
Until some linguist specifically argues against the feasibility of analysing -kun
as a sensory evidential, Korean should not be taken as evidence for the ex-
istence of “mirativity”. Lazard (1999: 104) and Aikhenvald (2004: 214) also
reject the analysis of -kun as a mirative marker.
3.2.4. Turkish. Already in the eleventh century al-Ka¯šg˘arı¯ described the
distinction between the past tense markers -mIs¸ and -dI as an opposition be-
tween unwitnessed and witnessed events (Dankoff 1982: 412, quoted in Fried-
man 2003: 189). The terminology for the distinction in Ottoman and Repub-
lican grammatical literature conforms to the same analysis (Bazin & Feuillet
1980: 12). Bazin (1968: 78–80) refers to the two morphemes respectively as the
“parfait de non-constatation” and “parfait de constatation”. Aikhenvald (2004:
28. Of the two remaining examples, one is the example here numbered (50a), which I have just
argued is easily analysable in terms of visual evidence.
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210) regards Turkish -mIs¸ as a “non-firsthand” evidential. The difficulty with
this tradition of analysis is that -mIs¸ occurs with direct observation.
(51) a. Bu
dem
çocuk
child
ne de
quantif
güzel-mis¸
pretty-mIs¸
‘Qu’il est beau, cet enfant! [How beautiful this child is!]’ (Mey-
dan 1996: 135)
b. Baksana!
dem
Ne kadar
quantif
kar
snow
yag˘-mıs¸!
fall-mIs¸
‘Regarde comme il a neigé! [Look how it has snowed!]’ (Meydan
1996: 137)
c. Çorba
soup
çok
very
güzel
good
ol-mus¸
is-mIs¸
‘This soup is [as I perceive by tasting] very good.’ (Johanson
2000: 82)
A number of scholars divide the uses of -mIs¸ into three categories: hearsay,
inference, and surprise (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 187, Meydan 1996: 127,
Johanson 2000: 65–66). However, this tripartite categorization is a heuristic
and not an elaboration of three morphosyntactially distinct structures. For ex-
ample, inadvertent 1st person actions are equally amenable to an explanation
as inference or surprise.
(52) a. Uyu-mus¸-um
sleep-mIs¸-1sg
‘I must have fallen asleep.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 192)
b. Dirseg˘-im-i
elbow-1sg.poss-acc
vur-mus¸-um.
hit-mIs¸-2sg
‘I must have hit my elbow.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 192)
DeLancey follows Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982, 1986)29 in suggesting that the
use of mIs¸ to mark inference or hearsay are extensions of the morpheme’s basic
meaning to mark surprise. Lazard (1999) and Johanson (2000) hold that all
three uses are instances of a larger category, which they refer to respectively as
“mediative” and “indirective”.
Considering the evidence which Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982) put forward in
favour of ‘surprise’ as the basic meaning, I like DeLancey am struck by the sim-
ilarity to the “Lhasa” Tibetan testimonial. Tibetan demonstrates that examples
29. Because Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1986) is in the words of the authors “based on Slobin & Aksu
1982” to which “the reader is referred [. . . ] for full details” (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1986: 159),
the later paper does not need to be considered here.
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of inadvertent 1st person action such as (52a, b) are amenable to interpretation
as sensory evidentials. Similarly to the Tibetan examples (40a, b) it is the ev-
idence of “waking over one’s books” or “feeling a bruised elbow” (Slobin &
Aksu-Koç 1982: 192) which could provide the sensory evidence which moti-
vates mIs¸ in these two examples.
For both Slobin & Aksu-Koç and DeLancey, the supposition that surprise is
the core meaning of -mIs¸ relies particularly on one example, which cannot be
interpreted as inference or hearsay.
(53) kız-ınız
daughter-your
çok
very
iyi
good
piyano
piano
çal-iyor-mus¸
play-pres-mir
‘Your daughter plays piano very well!’ (DeLancey 1997: 38, Slobin &
Aksu-Koç 1982: 197)
There is nothing to hinder an interpretation of (53) in terms of sensory evi-
dence. As opposed to DeLancey’s paraphrase “No matter how high my expec-
tations might have been, what I have just heard exceeded them” (1997: 38)
one could offer “I know because I have heard her excellent playing with my
own ears” as Johanson (2000: 83) also suggests. Like in Hare one can dis-
tinguish between ‘surprise’ and ‘sensory evidence’ in the context of compli-
menting a well-known musician. I have put this question to Professor Balkız
Öztürk-Bas¸aran of Bog˘aziçi University, who in a letter (29 May 2011) confirms
that “one can say this even if the piano player is a famous one” and provides
an expanded version of the example which makes this context explicit: Kızınız
gerçekten çok iyi piyano çalıyormus¸. Bu kadar mes¸hur olması çok dog˘al. ‘Your
daughter really plays the piano so well. It is very natural that she is so fa-
mous.’ This presumed premier instance of mirativity can be analysed in terms
of “sense evidence” but not in terms of “mirativity”.
The use of -mIs¸ with the 1st person in the reporting of dreams is also similar
to h
.
dug as seen in (28) above.
(54) Bu
dem
gece
night
çok
very
güzel
pretty
bir
a
rüya
dream
gör-dü-m.
see-dI-1sg
Büyük
big
bir
a
bahçe-dey-mis¸-im.
gardin-loc-mIs¸-1sg
‘Cette nuit, j’ai fait un très beau rêve. J’étais dans un jardin immense.
[Last night I had a very beautiful dream. I was in a large garden.]’
(Meydan 1996: 131)
Other examples demonstrate that an analysis of -mIs¸ as a sensory evidential
cannot be correct. Whereas h
.
dug can be used in a sentence meaning ‘it looks
like it is going to rain’ (20), -mIs¸ cannot be.
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(55) Yag˘mur
rain(n)
yag˘-acak-mIs¸
rain(v)-fut-mIs¸
‘It is reported that it will rain.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 193)
A sentence such as (55) cannot be used “on seeing a cloudy sky” but is “ap-
propriate in predicting rain on the basis of hearsay” (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982:
193). If both h
.
dug and -mIs¸ were mirative markers, it is rather surprising that
-mIs¸ cannot be used in (55) to say ‘I am surprised it is going to rain’, since
h
.
dug can be used in the sentence ‘it looks like it is going to rain’ (20), which
DeLancey would presumably have translated ‘I am surprised it is going to be
sunny’.
Another potential discrepancy between h
.
dug and -mIs¸ is the use of the endo-
pathic. Lazard (1999: 100) cites Meydan (1996: 140) to the effect that “expres-
sions of perception and feeling in the 1st person normally exclude the mediative
or evidential [i.e., -mIs¸] in Turkish”. In contrast, Tibetan h
.
dug is obligatory in
expressions of the endopathic; cf. (28). A close examination of the examples
however shows that Meydan (1996: 140) prohibits -mIs¸ with the verbs ‘see’
and ‘hear’ whereas the typical example of the endopathic in Tibetan is ‘be
sick’. The exact constraints of -mIs¸ and h
.
dug with verba sentiendi merit fur-
ther study.
Because it is implausible that both members of a morphologically contrast-
ing set mark the same grammatical category, the use of -dI to mark “hot news”
(Csató 2000: 32, Johanson 2000: 83) proves that -mIs¸ is not a marker of new
information.
(56) Otobüs
bus
gel-di!
arrive-dI.pst
‘The bus has arrived!’ (Csató 2000: 32).
The most substantial difference between -mIs¸ and h
.
dug is that, whereas h
.
dug
can only make limited appearance in hearsay contexts (which are best inter-
preted as indirect discourse, cf. Section 2.3) hearsay is a common function of
-mIs¸.30
(57) a. Fatma,
Fatma
garip
strange
bir
a
rüya
dream
gör-mus¸
see-mIs¸
‘Fatma a fait une rêve étrange. [Fatma had a strange dream.]’
(Bazin 1968: 79)
30. Johanson (2000: 65) argues against hearsay as the “central” meaning of -mIs¸, but the point
here is merely that -mIs¸ occurs frequently in hearsay contexts.
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b. Beni
me
çekis¸tir
pull
mis
bad
siniz
you.get
‘Vous avez dit du mal du moi (en mon absence). [You have spo-
ken ill of me (in my absence).]’ (Bazin & Feuillet 1980: 13)
The meanings of h
.
dug and -mIs¸ are thus quite different; such differences show
that -mIs¸ is neither a mirative nor a sensory evidential.
Because it is “not possible to interpret the reportative and inferential uses
as deriving from a central notion such as ‘surprise”’ (Johanson 2000: 83), the
conclusion of Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982: 198) that -mIs¸ marks the speaker’s
“unprepared mind” cannot be followed. Instead, the initial suggestion of Slobin
& Aksu-Koç (1982: 187) that -mIs¸ is “used for a range of functions encoding
events to which the speaker was not a direct or fully conscious participant” is
more sufficient, the category thus described can be referred to as “mediative”
following Lazard (1999) or “indirective” following Johanson (2000).
3.2.5. Kalasha. In addition to making explicit arguments for mirativity in
Tibetan, Kare, Sunwar, Korean, and Turkish DeLancey mentions “several lan-
guages with mirative-like constructions which are attested in the literature”
(DeLancey 1997: 47). He discusses four examples from Kalasha showing in-
ference (1997: 47, example 44), a compliment (1997: 47, example 46), and
involuntary 1st person action (1997: 48, example 47). These uses are indeed
similar to uses of Tibetan h
.
dug and Hare lõ, suggesting that Kalasha too prob-
ably has a sensory evidential. DeLancey’s example of “surprise” in Kalasha is
also amenable to explanation as a sensory evidential.
(58) Amerika’
America
bo
very
hu’tala
high
dur
house
kai
make
s´i’-an
pst.perf-3pl
hu’la
become.pst.infer.3
‘In America there are very tall buildings.’ (DeLancey 1997: 47)
Such an example “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide
world with stories for his fellow villagers” (DeLancey 1997: 47). In Amer-
ica the speaker would have had ample opportunities to gain first-hand sensory
experience of tall buildings, and appeal to this experience when assuring his
audience of the veracity of his fabulous account, but I do not understand how
DeLancey sees this example as showing ‘surprise’. The speaker may have been
surprised by America’s architecture some weeks ago when he first saw it, but
his mind is now fully prepared for the now rather old information which he
relates. The Kalasha form -la’ may mark sensory evidence, but cannot mark
‘unprepared mind’ or ‘new information’.
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3.2.6. Conclusion: DeLancey’s examples of mirativity outside Tibetan are un-
convincing. A category to encode ‘new information’, ‘surprise’, or ‘unpre-
pared mind’ is not necessary to account for any of the data DeLancey presents
in order to posit mirativity as a grammatical category. In Sunwar (49) and
Kalasha (58) the very sentences which DeLancey cites preclude interpretation
as ‘new’ or ‘surprising’. One may tentatively conclude that Hare, Sunwar, Ko-
rean, and Kalasha, like Tibetan, have a sensory evidential. The same analysis
is inappropriate for Turkish, which is probably better described as having a
“mediative” (Lazard 1999) or “indirective” (Johanson 2000).
3.3. Aikhenvald’s evidence for mirativity
Even if DeLancey’s characterization of Tibetan h
.
dug is mistaken and his evi-
dence for mirativity in other languages is best interpreted otherwise, it is still
imaginable that his characterization of a grammatical category encoding sur-
prise provides a conceptual framework which is uniquely well suited for the
description of a morphosyntactic category somewhere in some language. The
Ptolemaic model described the astronomical data available to Copernicus more
accurately than his heliocentric proposal, yet he was right in the end. Perhaps
DeLancey has the perspicacity to perceive a valid grammatical category de-
spite himself lacking evidence for it. In order to investigate this possibility one
must turn to more recent work on mirativity, and observe whether or not the
phenomena described as mirative subsequent to DeLancey’s work better match
his definition of the category than the evidence which he himself puts forward.
Aikhenvald (2004: 210) hopes “to present examples demonstrating that mi-
rativity can be independent of any other category”. She mentions phenomena
in eight languages (Kham, Cupeño, Tarma Quechua, Tariana, Makah, Choctaw,
Wichita, and Tsakhur). Primarily her presentation relies on Watters’ descrip-
tion of Kham (five examples discussed); she also discusses two examples from
Tariana and one from Cupeño. She provides no examples or discussion for
Quechua, Makah, Choctaw, or Wichita. I will treat the evidence of each lan-
guage respectively.
3.3.1. Kham. David Watters provides a detailed discussion of oleo in Kham,
which he labels “the mirative” (Watters 2002: 288). Although he devotes some
discussion toward demonstrating that oleo is not an inferential marker (Watters
2002: 288–290), he does not give any examples inconsistent with an interpre-
tation as sensory evidence.
(59) kãhbul
blanket
u-ri:h-zya-o
3sg-weave-cont-nml
oleo
mir
‘She’s weaving a blanket!’ (Watters 2002: 290)
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Watters provides two possible contexts for sentence (59): either “upon entering
an unoccupied room in Maya’s house and finding a partially made blanket still
attached to the loom” (Watters 2002: 289) or “when the speaker enters the
room and finds Maya sitting at the loom weaving” (Watters 2002: 290). In
either setting the speaker has recourse to the evidence of his own eyes.
In some of his examples the visual source of the evidence is very clear. For
example, when “Tipalkya, the speaker, spots the leopard lying beneath a boul-
der” (Watters 2002: 291), he says to his companion:
(60) m@nlal-lai
Manlal-obj
t@
foc
’e
hey
bab@i
man
m@nlal
Manlal
n@-k@
dist-at
z@
emph
ci
cep
syã:-d@
sleep-nf
u-li-zya-o
3sg-be-cont-nml
oleo
mir
sani’
confirm
‘(I said) to Manlal, “Hey man, Manlal, he’s right there sleeping, see!” ’
(Watters 2002: 291)
Like in Tibetan, the evidence is not necessarily visual. Although Watters pro-
vides no specific context for example (61), presumably the speaker has just
reached into his pocket and found his knife missing.
(61) Na-khurja
my-knife
Na-s@-m@i-wo
1sg-caus-lose-nml
oleo
mir
‘I lost my knife! [I just discovered it]’ (Watters 2002: 292)
In keeping with Yukawa’s analysis of the Tibetan example (34) one is entitled
to suggest that tactile evidence is what calls for oleo in this example.
Watters (2002: 296) claims that the mirative is also used when the source of
knowledge is hearsay; he does not however provide examples of such a usage
and the language does have a separate morpheme for reported speech. Because
Watters does not present examples inexplicable in terms of sensory evidence,
the prominent place Aikhenvald gives Kham in her argument for mirativity is
unjustified.
3.3.2. Cupeño. Jane Hill (2005: 66) describes the modal clitic =(a)m as
“used to express that the utterance is based on unimpeachable firsthand knowl-
edge”. In addition to the mirative, such a description would be consistent with
an explanation either as a sensory evidential or long standing personal involve-
ment or familiarity of the type marked by the ‘personal’ in “Lhasa” Tibetan.
The tendency of the clitic to be used “in the moment of discovery” (J. Hill
2005: 66) is probably the reason why Hill choose to adopt DeLancey’s term
“mirative”. The following example “in which Coyote has arrived, uninvited,
at a church service conducted by birds”, Hill (2005: 66) draws attention to
as a particularly clear case of a “firsthand, new discovery, surprise” meaning;
Aikhenvald (2004: 213) also cites this example.
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(62) Mu=ku’ut
and=rep
“Isk-ly=am!”
coyote-npn=mir
pe
¯
-yax=ku’ut
3sg-say=rep
‘And it is said, “It’s Coyote!” he said it is said.’ (J. Hill 2005: 66)
However, Hill is herself sceptical of the comparison with the phenomena
DeLancey described, which her choice of terminology invites, writing that the
“Cupeño clitic does not in every instance exactly satisfy this characterization”
(J. Hill 2005: 66). The use of =(a)m in a sentence such as the following, which
reports a general (and probably well-known) truth seems particularly at odds
with the interpretation of the morpheme as a mirative marker.
(63) Paana-t=am-el
tarantula-npn=mir-3pl.abs
ku-t-im
fire-npn-pl
‘Tarantulas are dangerous.’ (J. Hill 2005: 67)
J. Hill (2005: 66) specifies that “=(a)m is restricted to contexts where the refer-
ent about which the conclusions are drawn is not a discourse participant”. This
restriction sets =(a)m apart from many of the other phenomena which have
been labelled “mirative”. Tibetan h
.
dug (19a, b), Hare lõ (44, 45), and Korean
kun (50a, b) can be used with the 2nd person. Tibetan h
.
dug (28, 29, 40a, b,
41), Hare lõ (39), Sunwar `baak (49), and Turkish -mıs¸ (52a, b) can be used
with the 1st person. Despite her stipulation Hill (2005: 67) gives the following
example of =(a)m used with the 1st person:
(64) Suplewet=am=’ep
one=mir=r
ama
¯
y=’ep
just=r
ne-miyax-wen
1sg-be-pist
ne
¯
-ye
1sg-mother
pe-na
¯
’aqwa.
3sg-child
‘I was my mother’s only child.’ (J. Hill 2005: 67)
Whereas when in the languages discussed so far sentences with the 1st per-
son and a “mirative” marker have either the sense of observing one’s self in a
dream (Tibetan h
.
dug (28), Sunwar `baak (49)) or describe an inadvertent action
(Tibetan h
.
dug (40a, b, 41), Hale lõ (39), Turkish -mıs¸ (52a, b)), both such con-
notations are lacking in this Cupeño example. Aikhenvald’s appeal to =(a)m
in Cupeño as a demonstration of an unambiguous mirativity marker used inde-
pendently of evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004: 213) is unconvincing. Although the
clitic =(a)m occurs independently of evidentials and is labelled as “mirative”
by Hill, its use is quite distinct from the already heterogeneous assemblages of
morphemes which DeLancey used to define mirativity as a category.
3.3.3. Tarma Quechua. Willem Adelaar describes a “sudden discovery”
category in the verbal system of Tarma Quechua, which is marked with the
morpheme -na-. He writes that the “sudden discovery series refers to events
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which have been going on unnoticed and which are suddenly discovered by the
speaker or by another person playing a central role in the narrative (English
‘it turned out that...’)” (Adelaar 1977: 96). Adelaar (1977: 98) provides three
examples of this category. Without more context it is difficult to evaluate these
examples.
(65) a. yargara:rina:
we.had.climbed
masya:du
very
karutam
far
‘We suddenly realized we had climbed very far.’ (Adelaar 1977:
98)
b. cˇawraqa
then
cˇa:qa
that
kakuna
he.was
alqu
dog
‘So it turned out that he was a dog.’ (Adelaar 1977: 98)31
c. tutumanya
rainbow
intitam
sun
muyuraya:nax
it.was.encircling
‘A rainbow was encircling the sun.’ (Adelaar 1977: 98)
Although Adelaar’s description of the semantics of -na- conforms very closely
to DeLancey and Aikhenvald’s proposed mirative category, positing mirativity
on the basis of these three short examples would be premature.
3.3.4. Makah. Aikhenvald cites Davidson’s mention of a “mirative” in
Makah (Davidson 2002: 276). Davidson (2002) refers to an unpublished pa-
per of Jacobsen presented at a conference in 1973. However, Jacobsen (1986:
19–20) also describes the suffix in question more recently; it is a form which
“indicates that the speaker has only belatedly become aware of a fact or an
event” (Jacobsen 1986: 19), although this description does suggest “new infor-
mation” it does not necessarily imply “surprise”. The two examples for which
the source of information is made explicit show visual evidence.
(66) a. capaca.škub
‘It’s a canoe [after you finally make out what it is].’ (Jacobsen
1986: 19)
b. hitaqeyala.su.škub
‘[I see] you have arrived.’ (Jacobsen 1986: 20)
Jacobsen (1986) does not choose to describe this form as a “mirative” although
he invented the term in his description of Washo (1964); I defer to his judge-
ment.
31. This example I have located in the texts provided (Adelaar 1977: 410).
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3.3.5. Choctaw. In his description of Choctaw Broadwell (1991), never
suggests that -chih is used to indicate new information or surprise, but only
‘wonder’.
(67) a. oba-tok-chih
rain-pt-wonder
‘I wonder if it rained.’ (Broadwell 1991: 412)
b. Pam-at
Pam-nom
tamaaha
town
iya-tok-chih
go-pt-wonder
‘I wonder if Pam went to town.’ (Broadwell 1991: 417)
I do not know why Aikhenvald (2004: 214) mentions -chih in connection with
mirativity; it reminds me of ～かな -kana in Japanese.
3.3.6. Wichita. Rood identifies a verbal prefix iskira- in Wichita, which he
dubs “exclamatory” (Rood 1976: 87, 1996: 589). He gives only one example
ískirá:rásis which he translates ‘There she goes, cooking it!’ (Rood 1976: 95)
and ‘Look! She’s cooking it!’ (Rood 1996: 591). No conclusion is possible on
the basis of such fragmentary evidence.
3.3.7. Tsakhur. Aikhenvald (2004: 214) draws attention to Tsakhur as a lan-
guage with “mirative as a separate category”. The title of Tatevosov & Majsak’s
(1999) chapter “Средства выражения адмиративной семантики [Means
of expressing admirative semantics]” makes clear that they take “mirativity”
for granted as a semantic category. Consequently, they do not devote any argu-
mentation to prove that -o¯x=ud and -ëx=1d cannot be analysed as inferentials,
sensory evidentials, or other categories. Many examples are consistent with an
interpretation of visual evidence.
(68) “maIhammad-1n
Muhammad-a
Gelj
leg.4
jug-qixa
good-4.be.pf
ejx-1d!”
adm=coh.4
– haraj
cry
ha=w=P-u
3=do-pf
wuZˇ-ë
himself.1-erg
‘ “Оказывается, нога Магомеда срослась!” – закричал он. [“It
turns out, Muhammad’s leg was healed!” – he shouted.]’ (Tatevosov
& Majsak 1999: 290)
In (68) the speaker “[в]ернувшихся друзей встречает товарищ, оставав-
шийся со сломавшим ногу Магомедом [returning to friends meets his
companion Muhammad who had been left behind with a broken leg]” (Tat-
evosov & Majsak 1999: 290).
In a similar unexpected encounter, if I “думал, Тимура на свадьбе не
будет, но встретил его [thought that Timur would not be at the wedding but
met him]” (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291), I might say:
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(69) timur
Timur
ša
there
wo=r=o¯x=ur=ı¯
was=1=adm=coh.1=em1
‘А Тимур там был, оказывается. [But Timur was there, it turns
out.]’ (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291)
In example (70), “[м]не говорили, что в магазине есть мука. Однако я
сходил в магазин и выяснил [I was told that the store has flour. However, I
went to the store and found out]” (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291).
(70) XoI
Timur
deš-o¯x-ub-ı¯
not.be-adm=coh.3=em1
magazin-ë
shop-in
‘Муки-то ведь нет в магазине. [In fact there is no flour in the
store.]’ (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291)
In one example however, the evidence comes from hearsay. “Мне сын
говорил, что на свадьбу не пойдёт. Но мне рассказали, что он там
был, и я ему говорю [My son said that he would not go to the wedding.
But they told me that he was there, and I tell him” (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999:
291):
(71) Ru-na=r
you.1-na=coh.1
1xa-o¯x-ur-ı¯
1.be-adm=coh.1=em1
ma.
there
‘Ты там был, оказывается! [You were there, turns out!]’ (Tat-
evosov & Majsak 1999: 291)
Tsakhur as described by Tatevosov & Majsak demonstrates the danger of ac-
cepting that certain semantic classes exist a priori. Content to describe -o¯x=ud
and -ëx=1d as “admirative” markers, these two authors give little actual infor-
mation about their occurrence. Can they be used in compliments, in predica-
tions, as endopathics, in dreams? Some of the phenomena called “mirative” or
“admirative” have these uses and others do not. Assuming mirative rather than
arguing for it, does not, as Aikhenvald (2004: 214) claims, allow one to posit
the independence of this category.
3.3.8. Tariana. Tariana has “a number of complex predicates with modality-
like meanings” (Aikhenvald 2003b: 152), one of which Aikhenvald calls the
“admirative” (2003a, 2003b) or “mirative” (2004). In examples (72a, b) the
form in question encodes the surprise not of the speaker but of the subject of
the sentence; the construction is thus not a marker of information “new to the
speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 36), and consequently not a “mirative” marker.
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(72) a. Oli
Oli
yarusi
thing-nposs
ma-weni-de-ka
neg-pay-neg-sub
[du-ka-mhe
3sg.f-see-adm
du-a-ka]
3sg.f-aux-rec.p.vis
‘Olivia was surprised at things being so cheap [lit., Olivia, things
being cheap, looked (at this) in admiration].’ (Aikhenvald 2003a:
454, 2003b: 152, 2004: 213)
b. diha-dapana-se-pidana
art-cl.hab-loc-remp.rep
naha
they
matSa-dapana-se
good/proper-cl.hab-loc
kawhi
wake.up
naka-niki
3pl.arrive-compl
kawhi
wake-up
naka
3pl.arrive
me˜da-pidana
so-remp.rep
[na:ka-mhe
3pl.arrive-adm
na:-da-niki]
3pl.aux-doubt-compl
naka
3pl.arrive
‘They woke up in a beautiful house, they woke up and could
hardly believe their eyes.’ (Aikhenvald 2003a: 454)
3.3.9. Conclusion: Aikhenvald’s evidence for mirativity is inconclusive. It
is easy to agree with Aikhenvald’s observation (2004: 210) that “[t]he term
‘(ad)mirative’ is sometimes used for categories which have nothing to do with
DeLancey’s [. . . ] semantics of mirativity”. She mentions the “admirative” in
Archi as one such inaptly named phenomenon. Cupeño, Choctaw, and Tariana
are additional instances. Quechua, Wichita, and Tsakhur may have a grammat-
ical category denoting surprise, but it would be hasty to conclude this on the
basis of the available data.
Table 3 compares the various uses of the morphemes in Tibetan, Hare, Sun-
Table 3. Uses of morphemes in Tibetan, Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Turkish, and Kham
which DeLancey and Aikhenvald describe as “mirative”
Tibetan Hare Sunwar Korean Kalasha Kham Turkish
Direct perception ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ?
In a compliment ✓ ✓ ? ? ✓ ? ✓
In a dream ✓ ? ✓ ? ? ? ?
Predictions ✓ ✓ ? ? ? ? ×
Inference ✓ ✓ ? ✓ ✓ ✓ ?
Involuntary
1st person
✓ ✓ ? ? ✓ ✓ ✓
Endopathic ✓ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Hearsay ✓ ? ✓ ? ? ? ✓
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war, Korean, Turkish, and Kham which DeLancey and Aikhenvald describe as
“mirative”. Tibetan h
.
dug is a sensory evidential; its use in statements of direct
perception requires no comment. In compliments the speaker relates his direct
perception of the remarkable quality or achievement. When directly perceiving
himself in a dream or photograph the speaker uses h
.
dug to refer to his direct
perception of himself. If the speaker directly perceives the evidence of future
weather patters, he can employ h
.
dug in reference to future time. Direct percep-
tion of his own physical or mental state also employs this form (endopathic).
If the speaker directly perceives the result of past action, he bears witness to
this evidence in the testimonial. In reference to the initial event which bore
fruit in the evidence which is directly perceived, this usage can be regarded as
inference. There is no obstacle to the speaker drawing inferences about him-
self. If he directly perceives the evidence of his own action he relates this with
the testimonial. However, because in the case of volitional actions the speaker
would know of them primarily through his own involvement and not through
the evidence of his senses, this use is restricted to involuntary actions. Finally,
in indirect discourse one can use h
.
dug with reference to the speaker, if h
.
dug is
the evidential used in the direct discourse equivalent of a particular sentence.
The non-alignment of evidentials in indirect discourse is a well-known fea-
ture of “Lhasa” Tibetan grammar. These seven seemingly disparate uses of the
testimonial are direct consequence of the various pragmatic circumstances in
which a speaker wants to appeal to the evidence of his senses.
The many question marks in Table 3 make clear that much research remains
to be done on the evidential systems of Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Kalasha, Kham,
and Turkish. The discussion presented here suggests that those phenomena
regarded by DeLancey or Aikhenvald as mirative in Hare, Sunwar, Korean,
Kalasha, and Kham are sensory evidentials. The use of -mIs¸ in Turkish is more
likely an instance of the “mediative”. The case of Lhasa h
.
dug makes clear that
all of the “mirative” uses identified in these languages can be encoded by a
sensory evidential. The range of pragmatic circumstances in which a sensory
evidental can be deployed will naturally depend on the overall structural re-
lationships which the category bearing the sensory evidential meaning is in
opposition to. If, for example, a language has an explicit marker for inference,
it would not be surprising to see a sensory evidential barred from this usage.
The correct explanation of all of the phenomena which have so far been called
“mirative” lies outside of my powers. The evidence hitherto presented in favour
of portraying these phenomena as miratives is unsatisfactory.
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3.4. Concluding methodological meditation: Does mirativity lurk yet some-
where?
When found inadequate, the technical terms of science are refined or rejected.
The term “planet” has been continually refined without losing utility. In the
Ptolemaic system the moon and the sun were planets, objects orbiting the earth.
With the advent of the heliocentric model the sun and moon lost their status, but
the earth became a planet. The nineteenth century saw the proliferation of ob-
jects discovered to orbit the sun, planets such as Juno, Ceres, Pallas, and Uranus
were born. The introduction of the term “asteroid” removed Juno, Ceres, and
Pallas from the company of the planets. Pluto was introduced as a ninth planet
in 1930, but the advent of the concept “dwarf planet” in 2006 moved Pluto,
Ceres, and the newly discovered Eris into this category. Improved understand-
ing of the solar system lead to profound changes to the notion “planet” but as
a term for astronomical inquiry it has not lost its salience. Perhaps “mirativity”
like “planet” captures an important notion, which however must be refined to
satisfy an increasingly nuanced understanding of linguistic reality.
Mirativity as described by DeLancey is insufficiently precise and requires
refinement. Although it is defined as a category to encode information which is
“new or surprising to the speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 33) and for which he has
“no psychological preparation” (DeLancey 1997: 35), when reporting dreams,
as in (49), or trips to America, as in (58), the information reported has ample
opportunity to grow stale in the speaker’s mind. To decide whether or not “mi-
rativity” is a useful addition to the repetoire of grammatical categories avail-
able to descriptive linguistis and typologists, one must first have an account of
mirativity which precludes such anomalies.
I remain sceptical that reformulation of mirativity with an eye to greater pre-
cision will ultimately succeed. The linguist operates at a disadvantage when
compared to his colleagues in physics or chemistry; the semantic categories
employed in his analysis are not instrumentally verifiable. There is conse-
quently no way to be certain that a reformulation of a category is a refine-
ment. Perhaps the new formulation is just a different beast which implies dif-
ferent consequences. Lacking intersubjectibly verifiable minimal units of se-
mantic analysis,32 when a linguist chooses to provide a semantic label to a
morphosyntactic phenomenon, he does this on analogy to the use of that label
in the description of other languages. There is a tendency in the minds of some
to believe a linguist directly apprehends a Platonic semantic reality which may
be present in other languages, like a geologist verifies the presence of sodium
in a certain rock. However, linguists lack labs or machines to determine the
32. With the possible exception of Wierzbicka’s natural semantic metalanguage (Wierzbicka
1988).
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presence or non-presence of a particular purported meaning; in the words of
Haspelmath (2007), “pre-established categories don’t exist”. Thus, if a student
working on a far-flung language finds a grammatical phenomenon he is unsure
how to describe, he rummages through the linguistic literature for analogues to
serve as inspiration.
There is nothing wrong with inspirational analogues; notions like “perfect”,
although they have no Platonic existence outside of their application to the
analysis of a specific languages, have demonstrated their utility. However, an
analogy must be rooted in the description of a particular language or particu-
lar languages. In the absence of instrumental semantics, mooring a semantic
term to a particular morphosyntactic phenomenon is the only means to ensure
that the term denotes a thing in this world. The grammatical term “aspect”
Carl Philipp Reiff (1860) first elaborated to capture the difference between
pairs such as smotret’ and posmotret’ in Russian. By analogy to Russian other
phenomena in other languages have come to be similarly described. However,
some linguists, building their analogies from discussion of aspect in English
and not Russian, have gradually allowed the signifiant to wander through a
chain of analogies away from its signifié.33 Dahl (1985: 69) has even come
to the bizarre conclusion that Slavic aspect systems are “rather idiosyncratic”.
When “aspect” was unmoored from Russian, it came to mean all things to all
men. Haspelmath (2006) shows how “markedness” has fallen prey to the same
tragedy and consequently lost all predictive or explanatory power. If in a few
decades of use the signifié of the technical term ‘two’ gradually drifted to what
we currently call ‘three’, mathematics as a science would be crippled. Linguis-
tics is frequently crippled by just this problem.
If the champagne from Champagne is not champagne, then the champagne
from California cannot be. If the difference between smotret’ and posmotret’
in Russian is not one of “aspect”, the difference between English went and
have gone cannot be; the category has become meaningless. If DeLancey’s
understanding of h
.
dug is incorrect, then the ensemble of phenomena in di-
verse languages, which have been held to the rubric “mirative” on analogy
with “Lhasa” Tibetan h
.
dug must fall their separate ways. This is all the more
the case since none of the phenomena which DeLancey calls “mirative” are
independent grammatical categories which encode “surprise” or “new infor-
mation”.
That morphemes around the world can be pressed into service in certain con-
texts to have a connotation of surprise, is hardly surprising; all languages must
have some way for people to say that things are surprising. These “surprising”
uses of morphemes should be described as part of a full description of their
33. See van Driem (2001: 648–661) for an excellent discussion of this Irrweg.
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semantics, but do not suggest that there is a crosslinguistically valid category
of “mirativity”. All languages have some way of saying ‘I did something’, but
only some languages have grammatical 1st person. All languages have some
way to say ‘I am disappointed that . . . ’, but “the disappointive” is not thereby
a crosslinguistically independent grammatical category. A grammatical cate-
gory exists only to the extent it is definable through structural morphosyntac-
tic criteria within one language. The extent to which one can claim that two
languages employ the same category (such as person), the claim is that both
languages have structurally definable form classes whose semantics are similar
enough that it is convenient to label the categories similarly. Perhaps there are
languages which have a separate morphosyntactic category used for surpris-
ing information; I remain unconvinced. If languages are found which encode
‘new information’ in an identifiable morphosyntactic category of its own, in
order to avoid the false analogies that the moniker “mirativity” would neces-
sarily invoke, that category should bear some other name. Until the day such a
languages comes to light we “must leave to philosophers the task of clarifying
the status of semantic, i.e., conceptual categories considered independently of
their linguistic embodiment” (Lazard 1999: 105).
The case of “mirativity” is less like “planet” and closer to aether or phlogis-
ton. Relativity explains the behaviour of light without requiring clear, massless,
yet rigid, luminiferous aether as a medium through which light travels. Hold-
ing out hope to find something for aether to explain would be quixotic and
anti-empirical. The analysis of combustion as oxidization rather than the liber-
ation of phlogiston from combustible substances explains, among other things,
why magnesium gains weight as it burns. Like aether or phlogiston, “mirative”
does not accurately describe the very phenomena it was invented to describe;
it should, like aether and phogiston, be gently retired from scientific discourse.
To insist that we may yet find a need for mirativity is similar to suggesting that
some forms of combustion may yet be found for which phlogiston must be pre-
sumed. Of course this is always possible, but it is better for researchers to look
for theories to account for realia than to look for realia to satisfy a pre-existing
theory.
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Abbreviations: 1/2/3 1st/2nd/3rd person; abs absolutive; adm admirative; art article; aux auxil-
iary; caus causative; cep counter-expectancy particle; cl class; compl completive; confirm con-
firmative; cont continuous aspect; def definite; dem demonstrative; dist distal; dub dubitative;
emph emphatic; erg ergative; fac factual; fut future; gen genitive; hab habitat; hon honorific;
imp imperative; infer inferential; loc locative; mir mirative; neg negative; nf non-final marker; ni
new information; nml nominalizer; nom nominative; npn non-possessed noun (the Uto-Aztecan
“absolutive suffix”); nposs non-possessed; obj object; obl oblique; per personal; pist past imper-
fective stative; pl plural; plr plural; poss possessive; pres present; prf perfect; prs present; pst
past; pt past/perfect; quantif quantifier; r realis; rec reciprocal; remp remote past; rep reported;
rsm reported speech marker; sg singular; sub subordinating; subj subject; tes testimonial; top
topic; vis visual. Any Tibetan noun phrase not specified for case should be construed as absolu-
tive. Some abbreviations from original sources remain unresolved.
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